Older and wiser? An affective science perspective on age-related challenges in financial decision making by Mariann R Weierich et al.
Older and wiser? An affective science
perspective on age-related challenges
in financial decision making
Mariann R. Weierich,1,2 Elizabeth A. Kensinger,1,3 Alicia H. Munnell,4 Steven A. Sass,4 Brad C. Dickerson,1
Christopher I. Wright,1 and Lisa Feldman Barrett1,3
1Martinos Center for Biomedical Imaging, Massachusetts General Hospital and Harvard Medical School, Charlestown, MA 02129, USA,
2Hunter College, CUNY, Department of Psychology, New York, NY 10065, USA, 3Boston College, Department of Psychology, Chestnut Hill,
MA 02467, USA, and 4Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
Financial planning decisionss are fundamentally affective in nature; they are decisions related to money, longevity and quality
of life. Over the next several decades people will be increasingly responsible for managing their own assets and investments,
and they will be subject to the affective influences on active, personal decision-making. Many of these crucial decisions are made
and revised across the lifespan, including when to buy or sell a home, how to save for childrens’ education, how to manage
healthcare costs, when to retire, how much to save for retirement and how to allocate retirement funds. As average life expect-
ancy increases, many retirees will be faced with inadequate savings to live comfortably until the end of their lives. In the current
article, we examine the problems of and potential solutions to inadequate financial planning through the lens of affective
science, with an emphasis on how brain-based changes in affective processing with age might contribute to the challenge
of financial planning.
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INTRODUCTION
The first wave of Baby Boomers is reaching retirement age
just as their investment portfolios have been drastically im-
pacted by the latest economic crisis. A very large number of
older adults must decide whether to retire as planned but
with perhaps inadequate income, or to continue working for
a few more years to rebuild their nest eggs as best they can.
Regardless of their retirement plans, all adults with invest-
ments must decide whether and how to re-allocate their
contributions as they age. An increasing number of people
now must navigate the increasingly complicated and uncer-
tain world of individual finance. They must make momen-
tous decisions that have serious implications for themselves,
their children and other family members, and for any organ-
ization or institution that relies upon their contributions.
These crucial decisions are made under conditions of fluc-
tuating risk and great uncertainty.
Under conditions of uncertainty, people largely rely upon
heuristics to make decisions (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman,
1974) and in such situations often default to using affect to
guide them (e.g. Forgas, 1995; Schwarz, 2000; Weber and
Johnson, 2009). ‘Affect’ refers to the mental counterpart of
internal bodily sensations associated with changes in
homeostasis; it is typically described as a hedonic state vary-
ing in arousal (Russell, 2003; Bliss-Moreau and Barrett,
2009). Immediate affective responses can improve financial
decisions where the consequences are immediate (Seo and
Barrett, 2007) and can even overcome frame effects in
decision-making (Seo et al., 2010). How affect influences
complex financial decisions with changing outcomes over
the long term is a pressing question. In this article, we sug-
gest that the propensity to use affect to guide financial de-
cision making might become even more marked as people
age. Using research in affective science, we discuss some of
the challenges faced by people deciding how best to manage
their personal finances. In addition, although affect influ-
ences decision making for everyone (e.g. Forgas, 1995),
age-related changes in affective processing might be especial-
ly likely to contribute to less than optimal decision making
in older adults. The research strongly suggests that individual
financial decision making in older adults might not be as
rational and forward-looking as it needs to be.
We begin by characterizing the problem of ever-increasing
individual responsibility for financial management. A par-
ticularly salient example of this trend is the de-institutiona-
lization of retirement. We then address the manner in which
age-related changes in affective processing can influence the
quality of financial decisions, especially for American work-
ers now approaching traditional retirement age. In particu-
lar, we discuss how older adults may be less able to draw
upon detailed past experience to accurately forecast their
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own financial futures, leading them to rely more heavily on
momentary experience when making such decisions. Because
older individuals quickly regulate away negative feelings, and
they might have reduced access to ‘gut feelings’ in the first
place, they might project a blurry, but bright, financial
future. Throughout the article, we pay particular attention
to age-related changes in affective brain regions and circuit-
ry; these changes can have a considerable influence on how
people experience affect during decision-making and how
people recruit affect to make choices (i.e. to choose the
option that ‘feels right’). Based on these findings, we present
suggestions at individual, cultural and policy levels.
THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR
THE FUTURE
Individual responsibility for financial planning is a relatively
new phenomenon. In many countries, there is ever-
increasing individual access to the capital market on the
assumption that people can manage investment risk on
their own. This ‘democritization of finance’ (Erturk et al.,
2007) now is involuntarily extended to many working adults,
and people must decide for themselves how to allocate and
manage investments. We focus on retirement planning, as it
is one form of financial planning that is present across age
groups (i.e. initial choices about retirement plans and sub-
sequent decisions regarding re-allocation of funds), and is
the goal of many financial decisions across the lifespan.
Around the turn of the last century (ca.1880–1920),
retirement became institutionalized: long-term retirement
decisions were made for workers, not by workers. Many
large employers in the US (e.g. government, large corpor-
ations and universities) had accumulated a significant
number of older employees (e.g. 70þ years of age) whose
productivity often had declined with age.1 For example,
older adults were driving locomotives and negotiating
major business deals, frequently below the desired level of
competence (e.g. Graebner, 1980). During the early 20th
century, workers routinely were encouraged to exit the
workforce at around the age of 65. Rather than quitting or
being fired, workers accepted the convention, collectively
establishing a well-defined cultural pattern that was rein-
forced by fairly powerful financial incentives to stop work-
ing. Such institutionalized retirement had many advantages
for both employer and worker. It routinized a fairly import-
ant personnel decision and transitioned workers out with
little or no distress when (or before) their productivity
began to wane. It provided employees with a more orderly
and predictable work environment (Licht, 1983). Employers
introduced defined benefit pension plans, thereby avoiding
the public relations nightmare of dismissing elderly workers
to a life of poverty. Social Security, which began as a kind of
insurance against the inability to work for a wage (DeWitt,
1999) was paid to all retirees, augmenting their employer
sponsored pension programs (US Social Security Adminis-
tration, 2006). Perhaps most importantly, institutionalized
retirement reduced uncertainty and personal responsibility
for individual management of finances throughout the
working years by ensuring financial health in old age.
It introduced clear expectations about when a working rela-
tionship would end (Sass, 1997; Munnell and Sass, 2007,
2008) and did not require people to take much responsibility
for setting up and managing their income past a certain age.
In sharp contrast to the era of institutionalized retirement,
retirement now represents a self-designed and extended stage
of life in the US and in other countries.2 Many workers have
been retiring earlier even as longevity increases, and the aver-
age length of time that people have to support themselves
after ending their formal work life has expanded from
10 years in the middle of the last century to 20 or
30 years by the century’s end (e.g. Burtless et al., 2002; US
Social Security Administration, 2006). Key financial manage-
ment decisionshow to save, how to invest savings and when
to retirenow are made by workers, not for workers. In
2004, 63% of wage and salary workers covered by an em-
ployer retirement plan were covered by a defined contribu-
tion (i.e. employee allocation of funds and subject to market
fluctuations) plan alone (Munnell and Sass, 2008). Defined
benefit plans (i.e. employer-directed with guaranteed retire-
ment income) covering many of the remaining 37% of cov-
ered workers, moreover, were shifting to hybrid formats that
were legally defined as benefit programs, but for employees
functioned much like a 401(k) (Munnell and Sass, 2008).
According to some, since the 1970s, the notion of ‘perman-
ent income’ has been irrelevant (Erturk et al., 2007).
Even during the best of times and under the best
circumstances, financial planning is tremendously complex.
Decisions about how to allocate investment funds, how to
buy or sell a home, how to save for childrens’ education, and
when to retire involve a host of considerations, including the
projected costs and benefits of work vs leisure, projections
about longevity and the potential cost of increasing health
and long-term care needs,3 understanding the risks and
benefits of the range of financial products, projections
about the path of returns on financial investments, whether
or not to trust a financial advisor and how to choose one,
and estimating the impact of inflation. It is difficult to obtain
correct information about each of these factors, let alone set
the optimal weighting for each or understand how they
might influence each other. There are challenges in
1There is a vast range of individual differences in employee competence at any age; we are not implying here
that older adults are necessarily less productive.
2Many countries continue to maintain national, government sponsored defined-benefit plans. In this article we
focus on the decisions made by adults in countries for which defined contribution plans are becoming the
norm (e.g. US, UK, Germany, Sweden, Russia and many Latin American countries), and for adults in any
country where additional individual investments are the norm. Although we use retirement as the most
salient example of future-oriented financial planning, we expect that the age-related phenomena will hold
across financial situations in which individuals must make the decisions initially and perhaps revise those
decisions as circumstances change.
3For example, one third of US citizens aged 65 and older are expected to spend at least one year in a nursing
home, the cost of which is not covered by Medicare. Medicare also does not cover dental care and items that
require private Medigap insurance, including some prescription medications (US Department of Health and
Human Services).
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estimating weighting over time, whereby the same rewards
seem more valuable in the present than in the future
(i.e. hyperbolic discounting; e.g. Ainslie and Haslam,
1992). In addition, the average level of financial literacy, or
understanding of finances, is relatively low. For example, in a
recent survey, 55% of adults and 66% of high-school stu-
dents in the US did not understand the concept of inflation
or interest rates, and 37% of Australians with investments
did not know that their investments could fluctuate in value
(OECD, 2004). Put it all together, and we are left with the
conclusion that merely gathering more information might
not clearly point to the wisest (i.e. most accurate) financial
decisions.
Given this complexity, the shift from standardized
employer-directed to individualized worker-directed plan-
ning now affects people across the lifespan. Young workers
have time to plan appropriately for their financial futures, but
also face the challenge of complex financial decisions that are
made more difficult by high information load. This is par-
ticularly problematic, as retirement goal clarity has been
shown to account for a significant percentage of financial
planning activities (Hershey et al., 2007). A combination of
increased personal responsibility and unclear planning op-
tions may be responsible for an overall age cohort decrease
in financial risk taking (i.e. modeled financial risk taking for
Generation X members at age 50 was lower than the reported
financial risk taking of Baby Boomers at age 50; Jianakoplos
and Bernasek, 2006). Although a more conservative financial
planning strategy is safer, it also does not allow for greater
accumulation of wealth. Young workers will not fully experi-
ence the consequences of failing to plan adequately (or of
planning too conservatively) until many years in the future.
Middle-aged workers, for whom retirement rapidly has
become a de-institutionalized, risk-laden stage of life
(Munnell and Sass, 2008), are navigating financial planning
often without the benefit of having witnessed their own par-
ents making such decisions. For many of these workers, fi-
nancial planning has shifted mid-stream from
employer-directed benefit pensions to 401(k) plans that
workers choose and manage themselves. These adults will
receive reduced Social Security benefits, but they are increas-
ingly exposed to rapidly rising health care costs, along with
recent economic upheaval that has drastically affected their
savings. They also might be influenced by investment firm ads
that encourage them to purchase risky or costly products that
are difficult to understand. Middle-aged adults thus must
manage financial decisions that people find challenging at
any age, and these decisions are made even more difficult
by a number of affective factors. For example, uncertainty
regarding the current economic situation was reflected in a
recent Pew Research Survey (2009) finding that 52% of US
adults aged 50–64 have considered delaying retirement in the
past year.
Older adults are the majority of current retirees who
retired following a long-term relationship with a single
employer and whose employer-defined pension plans (aug-
mented by Social Security funds) now might not be sufficient
to see them through to the end of their lives. These adults
must decide how to manage their remaining assets and bal-
ance them with increasing healthcare costs. Financial deci-
sions thus are fraught with uncertainty even as they have
major implications for individual and family quality of life.
Although most research investigating age-related changes in
affective processing has focused on older adults (e.g. >65
years), some studies suggest that findings of age-related af-
fective changes are quite relevant for middle-aged adults as
they grow into older adulthood. For example, the breakpoint
for decision making performance on the Iowa Gambling Task
in adults aged 26–85 was age 55 (Fein et al., 2007), which was
consistent with earlier work demonstrating less advantageous
decision making in 56–85-year-old compared to
26–55-year-old (Denburg et al., 2005).
A BRIGHT BUT BLURRY FUTURE?
One salient aspect of financial decision-making is the need to
envision the future with sufficient detail to estimate later
needs and desires. In this section, we discuss how older in-
dividuals have difficulty imagining the future, leading them
to rely more heavily on their current affective state to make
decisions whose outcomes will not actually be realized until
much later. Unfortunately, using current feelings to predict
the future is not always advisable, and it can lead to affective
forecasting errors. Furthermore, older individuals exhibit
habitual affect regulation strategies are characterized by
marked inattention to negative information and, to some
extent, increased attention to positive, potentially com-
pounding the challenges of anticipating the daily reality of
the future (e.g. retirement). The result is a recipe for opti-
mistic, but not necessarily realistic, financial planning.
Diminished mental time travel
To plan for their financial future, people must first envision
that future. Envisioning the future requires drawing upon
past experiences (i.e. memory) to simulate what will happen
or how events will feel in the future (Addis et al., 2007;
Tulving, 1985). Although people do not expect future
events to be exactly the same as specific moments from the
past, they do anticipate that the future will contain many of
the same who–what–where elements that were experienced
previously (Schacter et al., 2008). The strongest recent evi-
dence for the role of memory in prospective mental time
travel comes from neuroimaging studies that compare
blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) responses during re-
membering and during imagining of the future (e.g. Addis
et al., 2007; Schacter et al., 2007; Szpunar et al., 2007). The
same regions that are recruited during memory retrieval (i.e.
the hippocampal formation within the medial temporal-
lobe, the lateral prefrontal cortex and lateral parietal regions)
also show increased activation when thinking about the
future, suggesting a common circuitry for mental time
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travel. In fact, medial temporal lobe activation can be even
greater when thinking about the future compared to the past
(Okuda et al., 2003), because imagining the future requires
features from past experiences to be combined in novel ways.
The medial temporal lobe is a region known to be essential
for the recombination and re-experiencing of different elem-
ents of a memory; its activity corresponds to the ability to
know the context of a past event and to remember features
such as who was present or where the event occurred
(see Eichenbaum and Lipton, 2008; Suzuki, 2008 for recent
reviews). Individuals with amnesia secondary to hippocam-
pal damage display a marked inability to imagine future
events, demonstrating that the unavailability of past infor-
mation impairs the generation of future scenarios (Hassabis
et al., 2007).
There are significant reductions in hippocampal volume
and function with normal aging (e.g. Raz et al., 2004; Dennis
et al., 2008), and there are related decreases in episodic
memory (e.g. Light, 1991; Small et al., 2002; Head et al.,
2008). These deficits are particularly pronounced when
older adults try to remember the specific features of past
experiences. For example, older adults are more likely to
remember only the ‘gist’ or general theme of presented in-
formation (e.g. ‘I studied a bunch of furniture’) rather than
the details (e.g. ‘I saw a table and a couch and a bed’; Tun
et al., 1998; Koutstaal, 2003). Even when both gist-based and
detailed information are available to older adults, older
adults are less likely than young adults to focus on the de-
tailed information. Older adults seem more rigidly tied to
retrieval of gist-based information, whereas young adults
seem to have more flexibility in terms of the types of infor-
mation that they can retrieve (Koutstaal, 2003, 2006). Many
of these deficits are not only due to shrinkage of the medial
temporal lobe, but also from a failure to recruit the medial
temporal lobe during episodic encoding and retrieval (see
Budson, 2009; Sperling, 2007 for recent reviews). Older
adults also show altered recruitment of the prefrontal
cortex in the context of episodic memory (see review by
Budson and Price, 2005), and these frontal changes may
affect their ability to retrieve specific episodic details (e.g.
Rajah et al., 2010) or to engage in effective retrieval moni-
toring (e.g. Guillaume et al., 2009).
These findings suggest that older adults will be somewhat
impaired in using detailed memory for past experiences to
project themselves into a detailed future, and indeed, this
appears to be the case. Just as older adults’ past retrievals
are less specific, older adults’ future projections tend to be
more general (less detailed) than young adults’ future pro-
jections (Addis et al., 2008), potentially further implicating
changes in hippocampal function with aging. In addition,
older adults with the poorest associative memory, an ability
that relies upon hippocampal function, also have the most
over-general future episodic simulations (Addis et al., 2008).
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that hippo-
campal re-binding of episodic features allows people to
generate detailed future simulations (Schacter and Addis,
2007). Without the ability to clearly remember and re-bind
episodic features, older adults might be left with only the
ability to envision a ‘blurry’ future. Although focusing on the
big picture can be beneficial for some types of decision
making, an inability to imagine the details of retirement,
for example, might make it difficult for people to accurately
make financial decisions, such as predicting when to retire,
and the relative costs of no longer working.
Older adults also might erroneously view the future as
exceptionally bright because of age-related changes in pro-
cessing rewards and losses. Anticipated reactions to positive
and negative future events can be more intense than reac-
tions to remembered past events (Van Boven and Ashworth,
2007), but compared to young adults, older adults show less
negative affect when anticipating loss (Nielsen et al., 2008).
Both age groups also show similarly strong insula responses
when anticipating rewards, although older adults showed a
relative lack of insula activation when anticipating loss
(Samanez-Larkin et al., 2007). Thus, older adults’ visions
of the future might be driven more strongly by their reac-
tions to possible rewards (e.g. leisure time) than by their
reactions to possible costs (e.g. loss of income, loss of
social contacts, reduced feelings of efficacy).
Taken together, these findings predict that when thinking
about future financial decisions, such as when to retire, older
adults will think about the positive aspects of their future in
a general, gist-based fashion (e.g. ‘I will travel’, ‘I will relax’)
rather than focusing on the specifics (e.g. Where will I travel?
With whom? How much money will that require?), or on
potential negative aspects (e.g. ‘I will not see my colleagues
and work friends’, ‘My income will be fixed and restricted’).
Moreover, even if older adults consider potential negative
aspects of future retirement, they might have a weaker
response to this anticipated loss. As a consequence, older
adults are at risk of viewing life after retirement through
hazy rose colored glasses.
The power of now
The bright but blurry future in retirement might be
enhanced by the way in which people use their current af-
fective state to augment forecasts about the future. When
there is little detailed information about the future, either
because it cannot be retrieved or because it was not available
in the first place, people tend to use how they feel in the
moment as a proxy for what the future will hold (for a
review, see Gilbert and Wilson, 2009). With advancing age,
the tendency to use current affective reactions to predict the
future might be enhanced and lead to additional bias in
conceptualizing the nature of retirement. In the absence of
readily available specific information from the past to guide
mental time travel into the future, older adults might be
more likely to default to how they feel in the moment as a
means of predicting the future and influencing decision
making. In so doing, they might be likely to overestimate
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the impact of a future event on their emotional response
(Gilbert et al., 1998). Although all people have been shown
to exhibit such affective forecasting errors, the limits to older
adults’ recollections of the past make this error particularly
impactful. Exacerbating the error is the fact that, when pre-
dicting the future, people tend to craft a mental representa-
tion that contains only the essential features that define an
event and omit the features that are merely incidental to it
(Wilson et al., 2000; Gilbert and Wilson, 2007). The failure
to insert more incidental or contextual features of future
events leads people to mis-predict their affective reactions
to future events as more extremely positive or negative (e.g.
Liberman et al., 2002). People also make predictions about
the initial stages or aspects of a future event, rather than how
it unfolds over time (Gilbert and Wilson, 2007), and the
concept of retirement as an extended vacation may stem
from this tendency. The reality of retirement is somewhat
different, however; following an initial ‘honeymoon’ or ‘rest
and relaxation’ phase, periods of disenchantment, reorienta-
tion, and more realistic routine eventually follow (Atchley,
2000).
Of course, not all momentary affective experience is pleas-
ant, and people also make affective forecasting errors on the
basis of unpleasant, negative affect (Liberman et al., 2002). In
particular, making decisions based on negative expectations
(Golub et al., 2009) or predicted future regret (Gilbert et al.,
2004) seem to be especially costly and unnecessary; people
usually overestimate their experience of future negative affect
and thus make unnecessary decisions to avoid imagined
future discomfort. We speculate that older individuals are
less likely to use momentary negative affective experiences
for affective forecasting, although the evidence is far from
straightforward. It is now well known that people use the
somatovisceral cues that derive from autonomic arousal to
make financial decisions (e.g. Denburg et al., 2005). The
anterior insula is a key brain structure for constructing an
interoceptive (feeling-based) representation of somatovisc-
eral cues (Craig, 2002, 2009). Some recent evidence suggests
that somatovisceral cues, experienced as negative affect (i.e.
the ‘pain of paying’; e.g. Rick et al., 2008), can keep people
from spending unwisely. Knutson and colleagues recently
showed that insula activity increases when people are con-
fronted with excessive prices for potential purchases, sup-
porting the idea that the prospect of paying can be painful
(Knutson et al., 2007). Similarly, strong increases in anterior
insula activity occur when people select risky options in a
decision-making task (Paulus et al., 2003), and individuals
with larger insula responses to anticipated losses are better
able to learn to avoid them (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2008).
The ventral striatum, including the nucleus accumbens,
also is implicated in the interoceptive experience of risky
choices (e.g. Kuhnen and Knutson, 2005; Knutson and
Greer, 2008). Older adults demonstrate less ventral striatal
activation during in-the-moment reward learning (Mell
et al., 2009), again highlighting the difficulty of accurate
risk predictions in older age. Older adults also display
more temporal variability in the nucleus accumbens com-
pared to young adults; this variability is associated with
sub-optimal risk taking performance (Samanez-Larkin
et al., 2010).
Older individuals appear to receive less intense afferent
sensory information from the body, which could differen-
tially influence their ability to affectively forecast negative
experiences. Meta-analytic evidence shows that negative
affective experiences involve significantly more autonomic
arousal than both pleasant and neutral experiences
(Cacioppo et al., 2000). Older people, however, often have
blunted peripheral nervous system responses (e.g. Tsai et al.,
2000), including less intense sympathetic nervous system re-
actions to risk (for example, an absence of differences in skin
conductance responses to advantageous and disadvanta-
geous choices in the Iowa Gambling Task; Denburg et al.,
2006). Older adults also show deficits in the dopaminergic
system that are associated with a decreased ability to make
reward associations (e.g. Li et al., 2007; Mohr et al., 2010),
which is consistent with a dampened affective response that
could lead to difficulty with risk assessment. Older adults
also appear to be less interoceptively sensitive (Mendes,
2010). Taken together, this evidence suggests that older in-
dividuals may not experience the ‘pain of paying’ when they
imagine forgoing their regular income to retire. It also might
be difficult for them to forecast their discomfort at the pro-
spect of running out of money near the end of their lives.
We note that this difficulty is not unique to older adults, but
that, in combination with other age-related changes in af-
fective processing, it is especially likely to impact financial
decision making for older adults. On the other hand, older
individuals routinely show increased anterior insula re-
sponses to evocative stimuli (e.g. Fischer et al., 2005;
Keightley et al., 2007) and risk taking (Lee et al., 2008) in
the moment. This age-related increase might be compensa-
tory, however, because the caudal insula, which serves as
primary sensory cortex for somatovisceral cues, thins with
age (e.g. Sowell et al., 2003).
Alternatively, sensory information might be available from
the body at similar levels across the lifespan, but older indi-
viduals might learn to ignore it. Older adults are less able to
regulate their autonomic functioning with age (i.e. they are
less able to maintain homeostasis; e.g. Pfeifer et al., 1983), so
that they may routinely experience more variability in their
bodily states. Given that much of this variation will not be
psychologically meaningful or predictive, older individuals
may learn to ignore the sensory cues that come from auto-
nomic fluctuation, making it more difficult for them to use
negative affective experience for the purpose of affective
forecasting. On the other hand, older individuals appear
to have an aversion to annuities (i.e. guaranteed payments
for the remainder of the policy holder’s life that re-
quire the initial investment of all funds; c.f. Poterba et al.,
2003), which might be evidence that even elderly individuals
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can experience the discomfort of paying if it is intense
enough.
The positivity effect
Whether or not older adults enact negative affective forecast-
ing, the evidence shows that they are motivated to regulate
negative experiences away, producing a ‘positivity effect’ that
has implications for financial decision making. Older indi-
viduals are more likely to focus selectively on and cultivate
the positive at the expense of the negative. They seem to
engage in a kind of proactive emotion regulation strategy
by which they divest themselves of activities and people
that make them unhappy and limit their experiences to
those that will make them feel pleasant (c.f. Mather and
Carstensen, 2005). With only so many years left, it is im-
portant to spend them wisely. According to Socioemotional
Selectivity Theory (Carstensen et al., 1999), people begin to
prune negativity from their lives when they perceive time as
more limited (as happens naturally with advancing age;
Fung and Carstensen, 2004; Carstensen, 2006; Pruzan and
Isaacowitz, 2006). People begin to focus less on opportu-
nities (e.g. starting a career, buying a home) and more on
limitations (e.g. not enough time left to switch careers) (Cate
and John, 2007), and begin to prioritize positive activities
and experiences. By other accounts, this positivity effect
occurs because negative information is usually more com-
plex than positive information, and so focusing on the posi-
tive is a way of dealing with declining cognitive resources
(Consedine et al., 2002; Labouvie-Vief et al., 2003). Either
way, early retirement might be a side effect of the positivity
effect. Except for the wealthy, early retirement can jeopardize
financial security near the end of life, yet early retirement is
not uncommon. Regardless of their original plans, people
sometimes decide to retire on the spur of the moment; for
example, after a particularly bad day in the office. Pre- and
post-retirement interviews with almost one hundred
middle-income individuals showed that frustrations on the
job are often the proximate cause of retirement, and that the
triggering frustrations elicited a more tolerant response when
workers were middle-aged (Weiss, 2005). This phenomenon
is part of the reason why older adults retire, on average, at
age 63 instead of retiring at age 67 (as they should) or age 65
(as they originally planned). Rather than retiring outright,
some older adults quit a stressful job in favor of a lower
stress and often lower-paying position (Hutchens, 1988,
1993), or a part-time position (Johnson and Kawachi,
2007). Although this delays retirement until an older age,
lower wages and decreased contributions to retirement ac-
counts also put retirement income at risk.
The tendency to retire early or downgrade a job to avoid
ongoing stressful experiences of the workplace might be exa-
cerbated by the fact that older individuals likely have more
difficulty using cognitive means to regulate negative affect,
leading them to rely more heavily on behavioral disengage-
ment strategies. Older adults are able to avoid the negative
and focus on the positive only when they have good cogni-
tive control and when their cognitive resources are not occu-
pied by a second task (Mather and Knight, 2005; Knight
et al., 2007). Under cognitive load, however, older individ-
uals show a focus toward the negative that is at least as
strong as that in young adults (Mather and Knight, 2005;
Knight et al., 2007). When not under load, older adults per-
formed better than young adults on an emotional working
memory task when the stimuli were positive compared to
negative, whereas the pattern of results was reversed in
younger adults (Mikels et al., 2005). Because older adults
also have more difficulties with dividing attention than
young adults (Verhaeghen and Cerella, 2002), perhaps due
to age-related declines in prefrontal regions associated with
cognitive control (e.g. Braver and Barch, 2002; see also
Buckner, 2004), it is plausible that they would also find it
more challenging to meet the demands of affect regulation
during working hours. Moreover, as adding even a relatively
easy distractor task is sufficient to deplete older adults’ cog-
nitive resources, older adults might be more likely to rou-
tinely experience such depleted states during the work day.
When older adults have depleted cognitive resources, they
might be less able to avoid negative information or to effect-
ively regulate their negative affect.
Although the neural mechanisms leading to the regulatory
effect in aging have not been investigated, at least some affect
regulation processes (i.e. those that draw upon lateral pre-
frontal cortical regions; e.g. Ochsner et al., 2002) overlap
with the same prefrontal cortical processes that are recruited
to assist with dual-task coordination (e.g. Jiang, 2004; Yoo
et al., 2004), inhibition of prepotent responses (e.g. Chikazoe
et al., 2009), or selection of relevant information from
among competing associations (see Wager and Smith, 2003
for review). Thus control of affect relies upon many of the
same processes that are used to control other forms of cog-
nition or behavior (Ochsner and Gross, 2005). Cognitive
control typically is thought of as a limited resource; when
resources are depleted in order to achieve task coordination
or prioritization, those resources might not be available for
emotion regulation.
In addition to selecting situations and interaction partners
to maximize pleasant feelings, older individuals show a
reduced tendency to attend and remember negative infor-
mation, which could increasingly cast a rosy glow on retire-
ment. A recent meta-analysis indicates that, in comparison
to young adults, older adults direct less attention to and have
worse memory for negatively valenced (vs neutral) stimuli,
but this age difference was small (and tends to be more sig-
nificant in tasks that require controlled processing; Murphy
and Isaacowitz, 2008). Both older and younger individuals
showed equal attention to or had better memory for posi-
tively valenced (vs neutral) stimuli, although there are
notable exceptions to this meta-analytic finding. Older
adults demonstrate a tendency to respond faster to positive
compared to neutral face stimuli, and slower to negative
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compared to neutral stimuli (Mather and Carstensen, 2003)
and they have shown better memory for positive information
compared to negative or neutral information (e.g. Charles
et al., 2003; Mather et al., 2004; Mather and Carstensen,
2005). More recent studies of gaze patterns suggest, however,
that older individuals do tend to look preferentially toward
positive and away from some negative stimuli (Isaacowitz
et al., 2009). This positive preference in older adults emerged
only 500 ms and later after stimulus onset and increased
linearly over time, consistent with the idea that this positivity
effect is due to cognitive control (Knight et al., 2007). In
addition, age-related deficits in long-term memory are
sometimes erased when information is positive, whereas
older adults typically are impaired in the long-term retention
of negative or neutral information (e.g. Charles et al., 2003;
Kensinger et al., 2007a and b). As a result of the age-related
bias for positive and against negative information, retire-
ment might seem like a great idea now and an even better
idea for the future.
Age-related changes in the amygdala, the centerpiece of
affective circuitry in the brain, also appear to occur for the
processing of negative, rather than positive, stimuli. When
viewing affective pictures (i.e. images from the International
Affective Picture System), older adults had greater amygdala
activation for positive vs negative pictures (Mather et al.,
2004). However, when compared with young controls
matched on subjective ratings, the age-related differences
were driven by decreased activation to negative pictures in
older compared to younger adults rather than greater acti-
vation to positive pictures (Mather et al., 2004). In addition,
when using a finite impulse response analysis to model the
timecourse of the amygdala response to affective pictures,
older and young participants did not differ in magnitude
of amygdala activation to positive IAPS images (compared
to negative and neutral images; Moriguchi et al., 2010).
Instead, older and young individuals showed different time-
courses of amygdala response to negative images. Young
adults amygdala activation to negative information showed
the canonical shape of peak BOLD activation followed by a
gradual decrease over several seconds in the hemodynamic
response. Older adults, however, showed a steep (i.e. rapid)
decrease in amygdala activation following initial peak acti-
vation to negative information. This age-related difference in
amygdala response was not due to vascular changes that
occur with age (i.e. the timecourse of activation in other
brain areas did not show the same efficient decrease).
Older adults’ more efficient offset of the amygdalar re-
sponse to affect is not specific to negative information.
Novelty activates the same affective circuitry in the brain
as valence and arousal (Weierich et al., 2010), and older
adults demonstrate similar timecourse differences in the
amygdala response to novelty (Moriguchi et al., 2010).
Even when novel material is not overtly affective (i.e. it
does not contain material with hedonic value), this material
still broadly engages affective circuitry. That novelty is
inherently affective suggests that affective processing might
play a role in many forms of memory regardless of the he-
donic value of stimuli. The functional implications of this
new finding are just starting to be explored. For example,
just as older adults divest themselves of negative experiences,
in some cases appear to dismiss negative information, they
also might develop a similar tendency to rapidly process and
dismiss novel (i.e. potentially uncertain) information. In
younger adults, uncertainty magnifies other affective reac-
tions (Bar-Anan et al., 2009) that could be used to inform
relevant decisions, but the effect on older individuals is as yet
unknown.
Although the cause of this increased efficiency of older
adults’ amygdala response to novelty and negativity is not
yet known, one possible factor is age-related differences in
functional connectivity between the amygdala and the rest of
the brain during affective responding. The truncated amyg-
dala timecourse (i.e. more rapid offset) to negative informa-
tion was more strongly associated with orbitofrontal cortical
activity in older adults, whereas the maintenance effect (i.e.
extended amygdala activation) was more strongly associated
with inferior frontal gyrus activity in younger adults
(Moriguchi et al., 2010). The stronger connection between
the amygdala and areas that help regulate affective responses
(i.e. orbitofrontal cortex) is somewhat consistent with other
findings showing a change in the functional connectivity
between the amgydala and affective circuitry involved in
control of sensory processing. For example, one study
showed a linear decrease in rostral anterior cingulate activa-
tion in anticipation of negative stimuli with age (Erk et al.,
2008). In addition, during negative picture viewing, older
adults showed greater functional connectivity between the
amygdala and ventral anterior cingulate along with
decreased connectivity between the amygdala and perceptual
areas compared to young adults (St. Jacques et al., 2010).
These results suggest both a more coordinated regulation of
responses to negative information as well as decreased per-
ceptual processing of negative information in older adults.
To the degree that a focus on the potential negative out-
comes of retirement might motivate good financial planning,
older adults’ regulation of negative information actually
might contribute to retirement planning that fails to take
potentially bad outcomes into account. Similarly, older
adults might not allocate an optimal level of consideration
and caution to novel financial planning information, as their
faster regulation of novelty might rapidly decrease the feeling
of uncertainty that ordinarily prompts people to make deci-
sions more carefully.
HYPOTHESIZED IMPLICATIONS
In this section, we have discussed how older individuals
might have a vision of a bright but blurry future that can
lead them astray when planning for their financial futures,
with a focus on retirement decisions. Realistically, the
perception of retirement as a ‘golden age’ is an illusion;
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retirement has become an extended phase of life character-
ized by financial instability, complexity, and uncertainty.
Uncertainty is increased by diminished ‘time travel’ as
people age; they not only are less able to remember the
past but also are less able to project themselves into a
future that is different from the present. In the absence of
enough information for planning this phase, people’s brains
might default to what ‘feels right’ (i.e. is consistent with
current affect). Although this strategy results in decisions
that are congruent with affective experience at the time of
the decision, it is actually extremely risky. Using only current
affect to drive decision making minimizes the influence of
relevant past experience and limits objective consideration of
possible future scenarios. The strategy therefore can nega-
tively impact decisions that are essential to the financial se-
curity of adults as they transition into retirement. This risk
might be exacerbated by the fact that older individuals have a
positivity bias. The normative aging process is characterized
by a generally adaptive propensity to pursue pleasant experi-
ences and limit unpleasant ones. Optimal financial decision
making involves a careful assessment of both positive and
negative factors, however, and older adults’ tendency to
focus selectively on positive information might set the
stage for a number of errors in financial decision making.
The potential age-related problems are compounded by the
fact that Americans can expect to live an additional
20–30 years after retirement. When planning for retirement,
people are not likely to compare the total span of their
retirement to the same span during their ‘early years’
(e.g. ages 25–45), and plan accordingly. Thus adults’ projec-
tions of the income required to maintain their desired life-
styles are likely to be seriously underestimated.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Affect plays a major role in all financial decisions, and this
role is especially striking in its implications for retirement
planning. Although poor financial planning is an issue at any
stage of life, it might be particularly problematic as people
age. By the time adults are approaching their planned retire-
ment age, they might find that, due to inadequate planning
or major decreases in investment returns, their accumulated
savings are not sufficient for comfortable living. In a slightly
different scenario, adults might save adequately for a
pre-estimated number of retirement years, but fail to ac-
count for unexpected longevity. Adults in either of these
situations who are currently nearing their predicted retire-
ment age require an immediate solution. There are two
broad options: people might continue save at a consistent
rate to fund the duration of retirement, although they will
have to sacrifice their originally planned retirement age and
continue to work for five additional years or more. This
option, with the accompanying need for potential changes
in investment allocation, is an increasing reality in the
current US economic climate. However, older adults who
prioritize the positive, including an idealized retirement,
might not recognize the detrimental effects of retiring
before age 70. As a second solution, older adults might
choose to let someone else plan for them; they can purchase
annuities that on the one hand guarantee income until the
end of their lives, but on the other hand can be extremely
expensive and can preclude the provision of inheritance for
family members. The choice of an annuity usually is driven
by uncertainty and risk-aversion, thus older adults, who
might be less likely to experience uncertainty in general
and with regard to financial planning, might be less likely
choose this option. At issue in both cases are the age-related
affective changes that can preclude the insight that is neces-
sary to pursue either of these options. In order to minimize
the damage of inadequate planning, both options are poten-
tially reasonable in terms of assuring adequate retirement
income. However, widespread adoption of these strategies
will require additional education on several levels.
On the individual level, educating young adults about the
risks of inadequate financial planning could be a prophylac-
tic measure, as science shows that young adults are more
likely to process novelty and uncertainty, are more attentive
to potential negative outcomes and are more likely to make
decisions to avoid projected future negative affect. Younger
adults might even be willing to enter into voluntary arrange-
ments that pool risks, much like mutual funds pool the risk
of owning individual securities, although older adults might
be less willing to pursue this avenue. Conversely, emphasiz-
ing the positive aspects of work (e.g. keeping the mind
active, social interaction, steady income) for older adults
could appeal to their preferential focus on positive experi-
ences. Reframing the definition of work by normalizing a
‘down-shift’ from high-intensity to low-intensity work, or
from full- to part-time work for older adults also could
help in institutionalizing a more effective and pleasant yet
lengthier transition from work into retirement. On a more
general scale, nothing convinces people like their own ex-
perience. Effective educational campaigns might suggest that
people imagine spending a week living as they would live
everyday retirement life, on the income they can reasonably
expect, and with the challenges of navigating boredom, the
loss of job-related identity, efficacy and importance, and
dependence on caregivers. Such simulation could bring
home the challenges of living on a less-than-adequate
income for an extended period of time.
Cultural factors broadly defined, such as traditions, norms
and expectations on the family level or the institutional level,
also play a role in the structure of financial decision making
(e.g. Bellante and Green, 2004). To the extent that family
members willingly assume the responsibility of caretaking
for older or extended family members, emphasizing the
ways in which wise financial planning will better position
the younger generation for education, home ownership,
and their own retirement planning also might have a positive
impact on financial decision making. In addition, emphasiz-
ing the ways in which working longer can make people feel
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better would be congruent with the positivity effect and
could have an effect on perceptions of the desirability of
this avenue. Also on this level, the culture of a given em-
ployer institution can have an effect on retirement behavior
by helping to set the perceptions of financial planning. Such
educational interventions can be implemented relatively
easily and without additional cost to companies. For ex-
ample, automatic enrollment in a 401(k) program that re-
quires ‘opting out’ rather than ‘opting in’ (i.e. new hires are
automatically enrolled) has been shown to significantly in-
crease participation as well as the maintenance of the default
contribution rate (Madrian and Shea, 2001). In addition,
employees who commit in advance to the allocation of
part of their future salary increases toward retirement sav-
ings have been shown to participate in such a savings plan at
high rates, remain enrolled, and significantly increase savings
rates over as little as 40 months (Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).
Such institutional changes in the perceived norms for retire-
ment planning would help decrease uncertainty around
planning, and framing these choices as positive would
be consistent with older adults’ emphasis on positive
experiences.
Finally, on a policy level, an increase in the age at which
workers can collect full Social Security benefits could shift
societal expectations of the ‘normal’ retirement to an age
more likely to provide sufficient income in retirement.
According to one estimate, 60% of those who retired at
age 62 would have chosen to retire at age 64 if the early
entitlement age (EEA) was raised to 64 (e.g. Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2002). In addition, an increase in the EEA would
send a clear message to both workers and employers that
they should revise their expectations about the earliest age
at which ‘retirement’ should begin.4 In addition, it would be
helpful to educate the public so that they feel the ‘pain of
paying’ if they retire early; early retirement costs them im-
portant savings that they will need later. For example, based
on the 2002 average wage index ($33 500) economists esti-
mated that the assets needed for 21 years of 80% income
replacement for an average earner retiring at age 67 were
$66 900. The assets necessary for the same rate of income
replacement for an average earner retiring at age 62 were
$155 450 (Munnell et al., 2004).
Now that the timing of retirement is largely determined by
individual decisions, and financial decisions have been made
even more complex by the current economy, understanding
how affect influences retirement decision-makingand
communicating reliable research findings to the public and
policymakersis critically important. Individuals and their
family members need to be informed about the affective
factors that too often drive crucial financial decisions.
Given the significance of such factors, policymakers respon-
sible for assuring reasonably secure retirements will also need
to consider counter-weights, such as public education cam-
paigns that appeal to affective decision-making, the promo-
tion of retirement-age norms or defaults that partially or
completely re-institutionalize the retirement process, or ad-
justments to public program rules, such as raising the earliest
age at which adults can start collecting Social Security or
access a 401(k) without penalty, that decrease the likelihood
that individuals will jeopardize their well-being in
retirement.
Financial decision making and financial security have
become more complex and more uncertain than ever.
Many adults have been forced to assume greater personal
responsibility for making decisions that will indelibly
impact their families and their futures. The personal stakes
are high, and, in order to make sound financial decisions,
people must use the tools at hand: the motivation provided
by the feeling of uncertainty, the currently available infor-
mation about planning, and realistic predictions about the
future. Older adults who might not have planned adequately,
or who suddenly might need to adjust their original plans
due to the economic crisis, might be at particular risk for
suboptimal financial planning. The very phenomena that
are related to what we value as wisdom in older adults
(c.f. Ardelt, 2003; Meeks and Jeste, 2009)memory for the
good events from the past, a bias toward the pleasant
(or away from the unpleasant) in the present, and positive
predictions about the futureput them at risk for being
unable to live comfortably until the end of their lives. This
risk is driven by a collection of age-related changes in affect-
ive processing, and information about the role of affect in
financial decision making should be incorporated into ini-
tiatives aimed at enhancing financial planning on the indi-
vidual, cultural and policy levels.
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